

# **INDAS-South Asia/Martin Chautari International Symposium**

**9th INDAS International Conference**

## **Peaceful Development of South Asia**

### **Program and Abstracts**

**5–6 January 2018  
Hotel Himalaya, Lalitpur, Nepal**

This symposium is partly supported by JSPS KAKENHI, Grant Number: 15H02599 ('Reconstitution of Societies during Post-Conflict Period: Cases from South Asia') and '21st Century Science Project Environmental Peace Studies at Hiroshima University.'

## **INDAS-South Asia/ Martin Chautari International Symposium “Peaceful Development of South Asia”**

This symposium, which has been jointly planned by Japanese and Nepalese scholars conducting studies of South Asia, is intended to investigate the current situation, issues, and future prospects of peaceful social development of South Asia from an interdisciplinary and comprehensive perspective. Peaceful social development is defined here in a broad sense as the conditions under which maintenance of social order and social development are achieved not by violent compulsion, but through negotiation of intentions or interests among members and stakeholders of society. Maintaining such a condition for long periods of time is a necessary requirement for political, economic, and cultural development of a society and a state. South Asia is traditionally characterized by diversity and plurality of different social groups in terms of religion, caste, language, ethnic group, race, and so forth. Through promotion of coexistence among diverse groups, South Asia has nurtured thoughts, practical wisdom, and political institutions that have made diversity a source of social vitality. In recent years, however, events such as violent confrontations and conflicts among social groups, or interference with free speech and suppression of minority groups’ right to live or right to speak by state power have occurred frequently in South Asian countries. Consequently, institutions or values related to peaceful social development have been hindered to a great degree.

For example, situations in which a social group that gained hegemony of state power through a democratic procedure came to suppress minority groups have been observed widely in South Asian countries. In addition, discourses and movements of resistance willing to use violent means, such as Maoism and Islamic fundamentalism, have spread, transcending the framework of states. In modern times, when the movement of people is becoming more active and the transmission of information via electronic media is progressing at an accelerated pace, comparative examination beyond state boundaries is necessary. Moreover, the current situation includes a mixture of modern Western movements and theories, South Asian traditional thought, and practical wisdom or movements related to peaceful social development. That mixture creates and operates state institutions.

Therefore, one must examine and assess the thoughts and philosophies, as well as the practices of residents, states, and institutions comprehensively. In this regard, it seems readily apparent that we must share knowledge and exchange views by setting up opportunities for interdisciplinary discussions.

Based on such needs, this symposium invites scholars not only from South Asian countries but also from Japan and Western countries to share knowledge and views related to the current situation and to issues of South Asian countries associated with peaceful social development. At the same time, we can hold discussions of ideas, institutions, and practices for sustainable peaceful social development in the future. To be more specific, we set three points of view: Democracy (democratic decision-making process) as the procedure for peaceful social development, Tolerance (tolerance for different groups and views of the world) as the value that forms the foundation, and Peace (stable maintenance of order among states, between state and society, and among social groups without violent enforcement), which are conditions under which democracy and tolerance are sought. These three are also requirements for the development of democracy, tolerant values, and attitudes. We hold discussions to elucidate these issues based on concrete examples from South Asian countries.

The symposium consists of the following five panels. At the end of the symposium, a general discussion will be held to share overall goals and future challenges.

Aims and issues of each panel are described below.

### **1. Democracy, State, and Institution**

As a political institution to realize the values of liberty and equality, democracy has been regarded as a goal to be achieved for many countries. However, strong criticisms have been leveled at the malfunctions of democracy, for example, as James C. Scott strongly states in his recent work, “Perhaps the greatest failure of liberal democracies is their historical failure to successfully protect the vital economic and security interests of their less advantaged citizens through their institutions” (James C. Scott, *Two Cheers for Anarchism*, Princeton University Press, 2012, p.19).

In South Asia, democracy is not necessarily highly valued. For example, India, which has maintained a democratic system since its independence in 1947 except for the less-than-two-year emergency period, faces the

problem of tyranny of the majority. Nepal, which overthrew royal rule, is struggling to establish stable democratic institutions. Pakistan, which removed a President with military background from power, is tackling terrorism by dissidents. In Sri Lanka, which ended its prolonged civil war, Tamil minorities continue to live under repression. How can democratic institutions solve these serious problems?

One can first examine tyranny of the majority, which, has persisted along with democracy as a political issue since ancient Greek times. The idea of fundamental human rights and the mechanisms of separation of state powers have been devised over time to protect the right of individuals and minority groups from tyranny of the majority. However, the concept of rights and the mechanisms to protect them can be trampled easily by pervasive state power. In fact, for example, in India, human rights of residents have been readily violated in the name of the “war on terror” in conflict areas. It is rare for perpetrators of religious riots to be judged according to the due process of judicial procedures.

In this session, we undertake consideration of issues such as those in democratized South Asia: how tyranny of the majority occurs, what kinds of new institutions can be devised to cope with it, and how democratization that includes the danger of tyranny of the majority affects international relations. Specifically, we would like to address the following points.

- a) Clarifiedesigned to prevent tyranny of the majority such as federal systems (India’s federal system, Nepal’s new constitutional process), and functions of the judiciary
- b) Under circumstances in which the rise of exclusive nationalism is supported by democracy, how have international relations between South Asian countries been changing? For instance, did the India–Pakistan relationship over the issue of Kashmir issue change by Pakistan’s democratization or by India’s change of government?

## **2. State and Religion in South Asia**

In South Asia, religious communities with populations of tens to hundreds of millions, such as Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, and Christians, have historically coexisted. Moreover, these communities have served important roles in various aspects of each state, including politics, economy, society, and culture. Realization of peaceful coexistence among

different religious communities and recognition of the right of each religious community to maintain its voice under democratic institutions are necessary requirements for the peaceful development of South Asia. Nevertheless, in 21st-century South Asian countries, situations have been created which threaten the right to live and the freedom of speech of numerically minor religious communities.

In India, Indian-style secularism by which the state equally respects religious communities and gives consideration to minor religious groups has been advocated since its independence. However, nowadays, a political party with executive members who consider individuals of minority groups, such as Muslims and Christians as “second-class citizens” and which professes the opinion that they should obey the wishes of Hindus, who are a majority, has gained hegemony in Parliament and in several State Assemblies. They oppress minorities in various ways, such as prohibition or restriction of minor religions’ missionary work and residential segregation among members of different religions. In Pakistan, although Islam has become the political mainstream since the 1980s, confrontations between different Islamic schools are entangled with confrontations among regions and tribes. Sometimes sectarian confrontation leads to violent confrontation. In Bangladesh, where Muslims make up most of the population, with a campaign for the exclusion of Hindus and Buddhists, who are the minority, sectarian struggles within Islam are intensifying. In Nepal, although secularism is declared in the new constitution, certain social movements have maintained the goal of returning to a “Hindu” state since the time of royal rule. The prolonged civil war that pitted Sinhalese against Tamils in Sri Lanka was an ethnic conflict, but it was also a conflict between Buddhists and Hindus. The civil war ended there with the victory of the majority. Nevertheless, one must closely observe the extent to which human rights, including the freedom of religion of Hindu “Tamils”, who are the minority, are respected. The future of potential confrontational relations between Buddhists and Christians in Sri Lanka is also apparently an issue that must be observed carefully.

As explained above, each South Asian country has followed a different historical trajectory, but all have commonly come to confront situations in which the religious majority holds hegemony in a state, places its own religion as the state religion (or *de facto* state religion) and increasingly marginalizes the religious minority. Both majority suppression and

minority resistance sometimes involve intense violence. Such a trend is influenced strongly by the globalization of terrorism, as well as international trends to label resistance groups one-sidedly as terrorists and to suppress them.

This panel examines the issue of how peaceful coexistence among different religious groups should be ensured in democratic political processes, devoting attention to differences in South Asian countries' institutions or historical paths of policies over state and religion.

The following three points must be taken up for discussion.

- a) Comparison of the historical path related to religion and state system and the prevailing circumstances of religion and the state in the respective countries
- b) Reconsideration of secularism and communalism
- c) What kind of institution can be envisioned to address the current intolerance against religious diversity?

### **3. Democratization and social movements in South Asia**

For the last twenty years or so, democratization and the deepening of democracy in South Asia have been widely discussed. Various activities by social movements facilitate or hinder democratization in South Asian countries. Anti-discrimination movements by Dalits, women's movements, and various ethnic movements have promoted the political participation of those who had been excluded from the public sphere. In India, Nepal, and other countries, movements demanding anti-corruption and "good governance" have attracted attention in recent years. However, exclusive social movements are also deeply involved in state power and at the same time have spread through grass roots support, such as Hindu nationalism in India and Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka. At a theoretical level, some take a positive stance in relation to the tradition of civil society and citizens' movements in South Asia and its modern developments, making full use of transnational networks (e.g., Arjun Appadurai, *Grassroots Globalization and Research Imagination*, *Public Culture* 12(1): 1–19). Conversely, others argue that, in places such as South Asia, only a few elites can participate in "civil society," while a vast majority of people who are not "citizens" but "the population," are targets of government by the state. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate the concept of democracy

afresh from various sites of practices in mass politics, including illegal acts, which are conducted from the position of “the governed” (Partha Chatterjee, *The Politics of the Governed*, Columbia University Press, 2004). Such problems are also related to the issue of what patterns of sociality and interaction that democracy was supposed to entail in post-colonial South Asia (Matthew Hull, Democratic Technologies of Speech: From WWII America to Postcolonial Delhi, *Linguistic Anthropology* 20(2): 257–282).

In this panel, we examine and discuss specific cases related to interactions between representative and procedural democracies as an institution, on the one hand, and various social movements, on the other, examining processes by which various social movements promote democratization of society and broader inclusion. We examine aspects of democratic institutional design that enable the social advancement of various groups (Dalits, minority groups, women, etc.). We also examine cases in which citizens’ groups or social movements hinder democratic social participation and deepen confrontations among religious groups, or conversely spread the value of tolerance.

The following five points are to be taken up for discussion.

- a) Relation between social movements and the concept of “civil society” in South Asia
- b) Democracy and sociality
- c) Multi-country comparisons of the minority, Dalits, and ethnic movements
- d) Civil society as a foundation for the value of tolerance
- e) Panchayati Raj in India and reserve institutions and political participation in respective countries

#### **4. Peaceful development and religious thoughts in South Asia**

In what traditions of thought or genealogies of values is religious diversity including considerations of diverse coexistence and tense relations in South Asia viewed? How have these elements affected the development of “Democracy” in South Asia? It can be said that a deeper understanding of struggles resulting from a mixture of diverse religious traditions as well as the ideological basis on which diversity is maintained might contribute to the easing of tensions and serve as a means of peaceful conflict resolution.

In recent years, events occurring in South Asia, such as confrontations and violent conflicts among different religions, have caused severe rifts in local communities. However, from a historical perspective, one must question the extent to which, or on what basis, each religion has recognized “others” as a different existence from self-(selves) in the first place. Furthermore, we can find an aspect by which it has established a coexistence relationship in the common *Lebenswelt*, or life-world, with such “others.” Moreover, it is true that (more than one) religious system with various ideological traditions and values has spread into each local community not only while repelling others, but also stimulating and influencing others. In that sense, to assess solutions to confrontations and conflicts among religions in South Asia, one must not only devote attention to a specific religious system; one must also understand the mutual influences and relations among religious systems.

During this session, we consider connections between traditional religions and thoughts and actual situations in South Asia, as well as the development and the meaning of the ideas of democracy, tolerance, and peace observed there. To be specific, we discuss the following points.

- a) What important effects do South Asian traditional values related to democracy have on politics, social movements, and other fields in the modern South Asian region?
- b) In diverse religious traditions in South Asia, how has thought related to tolerance of different religions been exhorted historically and genealogically?
- c) How are ideological discourse and historical discourse related to South Asian religious values function in the current attempts at peacebuilding? Or do they fail to function properly?

## **5. How does a conflict end?**

How does the end of conflict come to a society that has experienced civil war or large-scale violence among groups? A large-scale violent clash usually means that the reconstruction of order becomes impossible through normal legal and political procedures or social negotiations. Such a clash exposes hidden problems such as discrimination and suppression and suggests a need for the reconstruction of conventional values and institutions. Issues that society in the post-conflict period faces can be summarized

into three closely interrelated problems. The first is a problem of how violence and those lost to violence should be remembered and mourned. The second is a problem of “transitional justice” over illegal acts in the conflict period and compensation for victims. The third is a problem of restoration and reorganization of a society divided by the conflict.

In Sri Lanka, the civil war between government forces and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) during 1983–2009 ended with the government military putting LTTE to rout. The Sri Lankan government deems it as a successful example of a war against terrorism. The government prohibits mourning for LTTE combatants while attempting to unify the people through mourning for the (selected) war dead with memorial ceremonies and the construction of monuments led by the state. The government seems to be attempting to achieve restoration by “top-down” reconciliation and development programs. In Nepal, which experienced armed conflict between Maoists and the government during 1996–2006, peace was realized in the form of democratization and abolishment of the monarchy. However, similarly to Sri Lanka, it is difficult to say that the procedures of transitional justice are truly reflective of the voices of diverse victims. The new constitution promulgated in 2015 has also sparked fierce protest movements. In India, religious and caste conflicts have occurred frequently since the 1980s, causing heavy casualties and internally displacing people. Although the social and political rise of lower castes and the suppression of it by upper castes develop into caste conflicts, Hindu ideologists insist on unity of the nation beyond castes, partly by “othering” Muslims and Christians. Under the current administration, India aims at authoritarian rule led by the majority (caste Hindus) and top-down economic development. However, in any region, one can observe various practices that make full use of more informal social, cultural, and religious wisdom and ingenuity for the reorganization of social life, different from those led by international organizations or the government. Examples include the solidarity of families of enforced disappearance victims beyond the distinction between friend and foe at the time of conflict, contact with a missing person via a spiritual medium, and the reconstruction of the sense of space and narratives by those who experienced riots.

In this panel, we compare and discuss how “daily life” is restored or reinvented during or after large-scale violence, including civil wars and riots, in various parts of South Asia.

# Program

## **INDAS-South Asia/Martin Chautari International Symposium**

### **Peaceful Development of South Asia**

#### **DAY 1 – January 5th (Friday)**

- 10:00            *Registration*
- 10:30-11:00    *Opening Remarks*  
**Koichi Fujita**, Kyoto University, Japan  
**Yogesh Raj**, Martin Chautari, Nepal  
**Minoru Mio**, National Museum of Ethnology, Japan  
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- 11:00-12:30    **Panel 1: Democracy, State, and Institution**  
Moderator: **Michael Hutt**, University of London, UK
- 11:00-11:15    **Kazuya Nakamizo**, Kyoto University, Japan  
*Vigilantism in India: New Type of Majority Tyranny*
- 11:15-11:30    **Norio Kondo**, Institute of Development  
Economies, Japan  
*Creating Majoritarian Democracy: Bharatiya Janata  
Party in the 2017 Legislative Assembly Election in  
Uttar Pradesh*
- 11:30-11:45    **Seira Tamang**, Independent Scholar, Nepal  
*Gendered Anxieties in Nepal's Foreign Policy  
after Democratization*
- 1145-11:55    *Comment*  
Commentator: **C.K. Lal**, Writer, Nepal  
*Discussion*

12:30-13:30 **Lunch**

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13:30-15:15 **Panel 2 : State and Religion in South Asia**

Moderator: **Minoru Mio**, National Museum of  
Ethnology, Japan

13:30-13:45 **Peter Gottschalk**, Wesleyan University, USA  
*Imagining a Pluralistic Nation: Struggles of  
Secularism, Toleration, and Islamophobia in 21st  
Century India, Great Britain, and United States*

13:45-14:00 **Toru Tak**, Kyoto University, Japan  
*Religion, Culture and Secularism in Indian Discourse  
of Community/Nation during Post-Independence Era:  
With Reference to Kashmir, August 1953*

14:00-14:15 **Pradeep Jeganathan**, Shiv Nadar University, India  
*When Words Will Not Do: Theravada Buddhism and  
the Emergence of Violence*

14:15-14:30 **Kazi Fahmida Farzana**, University Utara  
Malaysia, Malaysia  
*State and Violence in Myanmar: The Rohingya Crisis  
and Its Implication on South and Southeast Asia*

14:30-14:40 **Comment**

Commentator: **Yogesh Raj**, Martin Chautari, Nepal  
**Discussion**

15:15-15:30 **Tea & Coffee Break**

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15:30-17:15 **Panel 3: Democratization and Social Movements  
in South Asia**

Moderator: **Tatsuro Fujikura**, Kyoto University, Japan

15:30-15:45 **Kusuma Satyanarayana**, English and Foreign  
Languages University, India  
*Human Dignity and Dalit Movements in India*

- 15:45-16:00 **Maya Suzuki**, Tokyo University for Foreign Studies, Japan  
*Contesting Justice and Dalit Rights in the Post-Ambedkar Era*
- 16:00-16:15 **Lokranjan Parajuli**, Martin Chautari, Nepal  
*Homogenization of Social Movement Dynamics under a “Clever” Nepali State, 2007-2012*
- 16:15-16:30 **Yoko Taguchi**, Hitotsubashi University, Japan  
*Negotiating Inside and Outside: Advanced Locality Management (ALM) and the Civic Realm in Mumbai*
- 16:30-16:40 **Comment**  
Commentator: **Minoru Mio**, National Museum of Ethnology, Japan  
**Discussion**

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**DAY 2– January 6th (Saturday)**

- 10:30 **Registration**
- 11:00-12:30 **Panel 4: Peaceful Development and Religious Thoughts in South Asia**  
Moderator: **Mitsuya Dake**, Ryukoku University, Japan
- 11:00-11:15 **Bhaskar Gautam**, Martin Chautari, Nepal  
*Secularizing Nepali Politics: Contentious Interpretation*
- 11:15-11:30 **Tsunehiko Sugiki**, Hiroshima University, Japan  
*Rethinking the Buddhist Discourses on Politics and Physical Violence*
- 11:30-11:45 **Tahir Kamran**, Government College University, Pakistan  
*Abdus Sattar Edhi: The Modern Incarnation of a Pacifist Sufi*

- 11:45-11:55 **Comment**  
Commentator: **Akio Tanabe**, University of Tokyo,  
Japan  
**Discussion**
- 12:30-13:30 **Lunch**  
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- 13:30-14:45 **Panel 5: How Does a Conflict End?**  
Moderator: **Kanak Dixit**, Himal Southasian, Nepal
- 13:30-13:45 **Tatsuro Fujikura**, Kyoto University, Japan  
*Communities and Mediation in Post-conflict Nepal*
- 13:45-14:00 **Malathi De Alwis**, University of Colombo,  
Sri Lanka  
*Political Communities of the Sorrowing: Living with  
Loss in Sri Lanka*
- 14:00-14:15 **Ranjan Saha Partha**, Jahanginagar University,  
Bangladesh  
*The Peace Paradox: An Ethnography of Everyday  
Life in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), Bangladesh*  
**Discussion**
- 14:45-15:00 **Tea & Coffee Break**  
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- 15:00-16:00 **General Discussion**  
Moderator: **Seira Tamang**, Independent Scholar,  
Nepal  
**Discussant:**  
**Kazuya Nakamizo**, Kyoto University, Japan

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# Abstracts

## Vigilantism in India: New Type of Majority Tyranny

**Kazuya Nakamizo, Kyoto University**

This paper will debate the recent spate of “vigilante justice” in India. One of the important characteristics of democracy is to solve various conflicts without violence, in institutionalized way. India has been maintaining democracy since independence except brief interruption of Emergency period, which is a rare case in non-western world. India, however, has terrific records of political violence like religious riots which killed thousands of people, mainly Muslim minority.

Recently we are witnessing new form of political violence, that is, vigilante justice. For example, vigilante groups like “Gau Raksha” and “Anti-Romeo squads” are enforcing their norms against minorities with violence, though the extent of violence is less than religious riots. Important thing is that their activities have tacit but strong governmental support, which is quite different from the activities of past vigilante groups like Ranvir Sena in Bihar. Ranvir Sena, for example, was formed by the feeling of insecurity in which the upper-caste landlords could not secure governmental support caused by the political change in 1990’s Bihar.

At the same time, recent vigilantism has also distinct character in the area of activities comparing to 2000’s. The Salwa Judam in Chattisgarh, for example, which had strong support from the state government which justified their support through several discourses about the need for containing terrorism or neutralizing “anti-state groups” such as the Maoists. At best, however, the Salwa Judum could be conceptualized as being a type of local experiment of sorts that was relevant to only the Chattisgarh state. With the “Gau Rakhsha” and the Anti-Romeo squads, however, the violence has been structured around pushing for an all India type of identity which in turn feeds into a new attempt to institute the new type of “Majority Tyranny” as being the normal.

Is this mean that democracy justifies the violent oppression against minorities? How can we interpret these tensions between democracy and

liberalism in current situation? This paper will consider these questions by analyzing the activities of recent vigilante groups like Gau Raksha.

## **Creating Majoritarian Democracy: Bharatiya Janata Party in the 2017 Legislative Assembly Election in Uttar Pradesh**

**Norio Kondo**, Institute of Developing Economics

The 2017 legislative election in Uttar Pradesh seems to be an epoch-making election. Bharatiya Janata Party (= BJP) won a land-slide victory with 39.67% votes polled. BJP got 312 seats out of 403, while Samajwadi Party (= SP) got 47 seats with 21.82% votes, Bahujan Samaj Party (= BSP) 19 seats with 22.23% and Indian National Congress (= Congress) 7 seats with 6.25%. Although SP and Congress made pre-poll alliance, the combination could not be a match for the BJP's ability to win the election. The BJP's victory seems to be a repetition in the 2014 Lok Sabha election. Several factors can be pointed out for the massive victory of BJP and the defeats of other parties.

First, the anti-incumbency feelings cannot be ignored among various communities which are not attached greater importance in the previous governments. The core support communities have been and are Jatav and Chamar in the case of Mayawati's BSP, while in the case of SP, Yadav as well as Muslim. Non-Jatav dalits, namely Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes, and non-Yadav Other Backward Classes (OBCs) are said to be not benefitted enough under the BSP and SP governments respectively. According to the preliminary report of post poll survey conducted by Lokniti, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, non-Yadav OBCs supported BJP more than SP, and fairly large voters of non-Jatav dalits went to BJP. The feelings of relative deprivation among weaker sections within the broad categories of dalits or OBCs can be a reason for them to change their supporting political parties in the economically backward Uttar Pradesh.

Second, the popularity of BJP is, no doubt, important. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's popularity among Hindu cannot be unimportant since

the 2017 legislative election could be understood as a continuation of the 2014 Lok Sabha election. In addition, the propagations of party's ideology "Hindutva" cannot be ignored. Several news reported that workers of BJP and its associate organisations, like Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), propagated communal discourses among Hindu.

The combination of these factors and other pre-election contingencies, such as family feud in the SP, seem to have brought the massive victory to BJP. The analysis in the paper is conducted as to how and in what condition BJP got massive support from people. In addition, I would like to make a premature analysis of the newly established BJP government under Yogi Adityanath.

## **Gendered Anxieties in Nepal's Foreign Policy after Democratization**

**Seira Tamang**, Independent Scholar, Nepal

From the build-up to the actual visit to the aftermath, Indian PM Narendra Modi's two day visit to Nepal from 3-4 August 2014, captured the imagination of Nepalis. Touted as a heady new beginning for India-Nepal relations, state and civil society elites victoriously underlined stated changes away from India as a "big brother;" the message conveyed by Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj during her pre-Modi visit to Nepal in 25-27 July, 2014 was that "India is not the big brother, it is just an elder brother." The appeal of being equal male siblings in the new neighbourhood policy and world order reveal that gender is key to understanding Nepal's foreign policy—there are notions of manliness that are clearly shaping new foreign policy discussions.

Central to these and past foreign policy discussions has been the issue of sovereignty, instructive in the light of Nepal's claims to be exceptional in South Asia for being "never-being colonized." The claims of "exceptionalism" holds some empirical grounds, but nationalist discourses of "independence" and "sovereignty" masks the constraints on Nepali political elites imposed by British imperial forces in the South Asian subcontinent. And in contrast to the debates emerging from Modi's visit, it further underplays the effects on Nepal of the

neighbouring countries of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan's post-colonial histories. With the rise of Chinese economic and political influence in Nepal in recent years, sovereignty and Nepal's place in the new emerging world order has become a key concern for Nepali state elites.

The paper is based on the work of feminist International Relation theorists and arguments that gender is conceptually, empirically, and normatively essential to studying international relations. Including gender as a central category of analysis means characterizing it as both constitutive of and a causal factor in international politics. By focusing on how Nepali male elites highlight foreign policy issues such as military strategy, foreign aid, UN annual meetings and China and India relations while continually asserting its historically uninterrupted sovereign status, this paper will underline the gendered calculations and anxieties that underwrite foreign policy initiatives of male political elites in Nepal in post 1990 Nepal. The paper will mainly utilize discourse analysis of media reports and foreign policy related articles and books and will focus on key events such as the recent China and India entanglement over Doklam in 2017, as well as India/Nepal border closures in 2015/2016.

## **Imagining a Pluralistic Nation: Struggles of Secularism, Toleration, and Islamophobia in 21st Century India, Great Britain, and United States**

**Peter Gottschalk**, Wesleyan University, USA

Great Britain, the United States, and India. Three nations bound by history and empire, and defined in part by ideals of secularism and tolerance. Yet, each nation currently struggles with endemic Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment that takes different expressions. Arguably, the forms of discrimination have emerged in response not only to varying social circumstances, but to the nature of secularism, pluralism, and toleration in their countries.

Drawing on the work of scholars of secularism, this paper will examine how the current British, American, and Indian national states seek to shape a normative nationalist subjectivity that references principles

of toleration yet facilitates intolerance toward Muslims and suspicion toward Islamic traditions. These notions of toleration often rely on the projection of universal principles by which many nations understand themselves, even as they simultaneously proclaim a particularism that seeks to define each nation's citizens as collectively distinctive from those of other nations. Establishing a shared history, defining bodies of belonging, and positing certain shared values, all serve in the endeavor to imagine the exemplary national subject, as well as those who do not share their subjectivity.

For centuries, Muslims and Islamic traditions have represented foils by which Britons and Americans defined their nations, values, religions, and citizens. Since India entered its first phase of nationalist self-imagination, there have been some who have similarly sought to negatively define the nation relative to Muslims. Today, significant populist nationalist ideologies attempt to harness this enduring Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment through a divergence of approaches that reflect the varied struggles each nation has faced in fitting its own ideals of pluralism, toleration, and secularism.

## **Religion, Culture and Secularism in Indian Discourse of Community/Nation during Post-Independence Era: With Reference to Kashmir, August 1953**

**Toru Tak**, Kyoto University, Japan

Kashmir has been a dispute between India and Pakistan since their Partition cum Independence in 1947. It has been a dispute because India wanted to keep Kashmir with it as a symbol of its official secularism (Kashmir as a Muslim-dominant state has joined the Hindu-dominant India by its own will, according to India, thus it has proved that India is a multi-religious, secular state) while Pakistan as a Muslim state obviously wanted to hold Kashmir as Kashmir too is a Muslim-dominant state. And in this way this dispute involves the ideas of religion and secularism from its inception.

However, for a precise understanding of the nature of this dispute and its historical development, we need to capture each of these terms

(religion, secularism) in its original historical context. When the dispute arose in the late 1940s-early 1950s, the conceptual status of the terms religion and secularism (along with that of culture, which was emerging as a prominent analytical term for social sciences during the first half of the 20th century, and was inseparable from the concept of religion, as T.S. Eliot argued, for example) was supposedly quite different from that in today's common perceptions of secularization theory, where religion ultimately belongs only to the private sphere. Firstly, I discuss about Nehru's way of conceptualizing religion and secularism in those days, in connection with John Dewey's thoughts, which belong to such different time and paradigm. Dewey is known to have influenced Nehru and Ambedkar, the two top Indian intellectual-politicians who delineated the official concepts of religion and secularism in post-Independence India.

Secondly, I discuss how religion and secularism were conceptualized by Nehru and Sardar Patel in their dealings with the Kashmir issue. Here I may also refer to British and American concepts of "Muslim world" in those days: it has been revealed that these Western powers had decided their policies on Kashmir by making balances with those on Middle Eastern areas/countries such as Palestine, and both Kashmir and Palestine were considered by them "Muslim" issue.

Lastly, I examine how such Indian conception of religion and secularism had (or didn't have) influences on Kashmir's ground situation, especially on Kashmiris' conceptualization of nation and community at the time of Sheikh Abdullah's arrest in August 1953. Today this arrest of Kashmir's tallest leader by Nehru's India is commonly perceived among Kashmiris as the first betrayal of India that legitimates Kashmir's separate nationalism.

## **When Words Will Not Do: Theravada Buddhism and the Emergence of Violence**

**Pradeep Jeganathan, Shiv Nadar University, India**

This paper re-visits the relationship of "Theravada Buddhism" and "violence." This remains in one register an intractable problem, for

it is usually thought that Buddhist locution advocates non-violence, not its opposite. Conventionally the problem is treated as one of the “politicization” of Buddhism, given its alliance with the State, or given subaltern Buddhist revival movements. I attempt find another way into this problem by examining the imbrications of Buddhist locution and gesture, and the relationship of this matrix to latent force. I argue that shifts in locations of sovereignty from pre-colonial to colonial Kingship, produce the conditions of possibility of force breaking through its legitimizing frame into violence. The paper works with Sri Lankan ethnological materials, pertaining to the genealogy of the iconography of Buddha and the Sanga (Monkhood).

## **State and Violence in Myanmar: The Rohingya Crisis and its implication on South and Southeast Asia**

**Kazi Fahmida Farzana**, University Utara Malaysia, Malaysia

Myanmar, a country has recently started its journey towards the path of democracy after five decades of military rule. Some argue that it is a quasi-democracy as the influence and presence of military is still very strong in the current parliamentary government. In recent years, the country continues to perform badly in terms of maintaining its human rights situation. It has projected intolerance towards different ethnic minority groups and religious views and attitudes. A particular case would be the Rohingya Muslim ethnic minority from the Buddhist majority Rakhine state of Myanmar, whose citizenship has been taken away through constitutional changes and made Rohingya stateless within their own country. This particular structural inequality resulted in much brutal structural violence by the state to suppress the group’s right to speak and even the right to live.

According to the recent UN report, since August 25 (2017) approximately 420,000 Rohingya population were forced from the Rakhine state of Myanmar to enter into Bangladesh making it the third biggest exodus of Rohingya recorded in history. The first and second forced migrations were in 1978 during the Operation *Nagamin* (Dragon

King) and in 1991 during the *Pyi Thaya* (Prosperous Country) operation. Like before, people are again fleeing to save their lives from arson, torture, arbitrary killing, gang rape, and other grave human rights violations by the military and other security and non-security forces in Myanmar. This situation soon will have regional implications with more refugees coming to India, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and other parts of the world, many by taking illegal routes, therefore, leading to human trafficking and social insecurity.

This paper investigates the current situation of the Rohingya crisis and its implications on South and Southeast Asian regions. By using the theory of statelessness, it criticizes the state institution that creates stateless community within its boundary. It argues that as a state, Myanmar again failed to realize that “state unity” cannot be achieved by violent compulsion; rather, it should be through respecting diversity and coexistence among diverse groups. Apparently, regional organizations such as SAARC and ASEAN have also failed to take actions against Myanmar to stop violence in the Rakhine state. The consequences of the Rohingya crisis will hinder peaceful development of South and Southeast Asia; therefore, it is imperative to revisit the root causes and find sustainable peaceful solution to this issue.

## **Human Dignity and Dalit Movements in India**

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Dalit movements in the 1970s and 1980s emerged as a response to a series massacres. Commentators observed that the process of modernization from the 1950s did not eliminate caste based social distinctions and discrimination. In fact, the dominant caste groups emerged as rich peasants and tried to enforce pre-modern caste inequality. I would like to examine the question of human dignity that the Dalit movements have articulated in this context. I attempt a brief critical overview of the massacres, the SC/ST Atrocities Prevention Act 1989, the Dalit literary movement and Dalit critique of the Left political

movements to highlight the significance of Dalit movements and their contribution to social change.

## **Contesting Justice and Dalit Rights in the Post-Ambedkar Era**

**Maya Suzuki**, Tokyo University for Foreign Studies, Japan

The concept of social justice has increasingly developed in recent social science literature. This is not limited to scholarly concern. In practice, the question of justice has substantially gripped the imaginations of activists who participate in social movements and everyday struggles against the deeply embedded inequality and humiliation in caste hierarchy. With the increase in educational, economic, and political empowerment, the Dalits have risen to challenge existing policies and demand an equal share in state resources.

This study highlights the current socio-political dynamics of caste from the perspective of the judicial activism practiced by the Dalit community in urban north India. How and why do Dalit lawyer-activists gain access to a judicial institution like the Supreme Court? This question is examined through an ethnographic case study of the Balmikis (known as the sweeper caste) in Delhi, who were not sufficiently appreciated in previous Dalit studies because of their socially and politically disadvantaged status among the Dalit castes. The rise of judicial Dalit activism has been catalyzed with the emergence of a new generation of Dalit activists who have acquired political awareness through higher education and public employment. Most of them proclaim themselves to be followers of B.R. Ambedkar, and his law career draws members of the new Dalit generation who attempt to enter the legal profession. The case study also analyzes their conceptualization and strategies of social justice in the course of performing their collective actions, while focusing on a distinctive feature of what they call “justice” that is conditioned by local Dalit caste relationships.

The findings of this research lead to the argument that while most Balmikis try to keep their lower caste status hidden, they need to display their caste identity in order to benefit from welfare schemes and assert

their rights through the public interest litigations (PILs) that are currently occurring increasingly. The Dalit reconfiguration of justice also offers insights into the judicialization of politics in contemporary India.

## **Homogenization of Social Movement Dynamics under a “Clever” Nepali State, 2007–2012**

**Lokranjan Parajuli, Martin Chautari, Nepal**

Following the success of the 2006 popular movement in Nepal, there was a rise in the number of successful social movements—successful in that they were able to force the state to respond as well as agree to their principal demands. Starting with the Madhesi movement in early 2007, the Nepali state reached agreements/understandings with around two dozen agitating groups by May 2012. The focus of this paper is on those agreements/understandings, and their subsequent executions or lack thereof. Through this focus, the paper attempts to comment on the particularities of both the movements and the Nepali state during those five years. First I will show that these movements have largely followed a similar trajectory before concluding with an agreement with the state. In so doing, they have entrenched a particular template of a “successful” movement, thus contributing to the homogenization of movement dynamics in Nepal. Second, I look at the performance of the Nepali state as it entered into various understandings/agreements with the different movements. In looking at the various agreements as evidence of state recognition, it would be tempting to show that by agreeing even to mutually exclusive demands, the Nepali state was a particularly “weak” one during this phase. Instead I argue that the agreements that it entered into show that the Nepali state during this period was neither “weak” nor “strong” but rather a particularly “clever” one, performing its job according to the demands of the day.

## Negotiating Inside and Outside: Advanced Locality Management (ALM) and the Civic Realm in Mumbai

Yoko Taguchi, Hitotsubashi University, Japan

Citizen participation has gained renewed importance in Indian cities. Contemporary public-private partnerships are characterized by an emphasis on “depoliticisation” and market-oriented reforms. This reflects the tension between “political society” and “civil society,” where “civil society” often decries the corruption and nepotism of “political society” by upholding the logic of the free market and promoting its own positions as “apolitical.” This paper examines the practices and effects of these “apolitical” politics of citizens in relation to urban space and personhood.

This conception of citizen participation should be located within broader middle-class activism in contemporary India. Contrary to pro-poor social movements, this trend has been criticized as a “new middle-class” activism that facilitates increased control over the city’s public space. Criticism of the new middle class in India, analogous to Aihwa Ong’s framework for other countries in Asia, has been broadly discussed within the dualism of the “global” (colonialism and predatory capitalism) and the “local” (the resistance of the subaltern), as either the “global” controlling the “local” or the “local” taming the “global.” In this context, prominent cases of urban activism appear to represent the irresistible power of world-class aesthetics and global logic of neoliberalism oppressing the local subalterns.

When examined closely, however, practices of civic activism do not quite fit the dichotomy of global power versus local resistance. Therefore, this paper investigates how concepts and practices are negotiated when different realms of power and control are entangled. I do this by focusing on Mumbai citizens’ groups called Advanced Locality Management (ALM) and by analyzing how this new type of urban development was informed by the (“global”) notion of the public and private, in relation to the (“local”) notion of the inside and outside, and how this new participation practice is intervening in urban space as well as activists’ selves.

Citizen participation, with its “apolitical” appearance, is a field of intricate political practice where the public/private has become connected to the physical and conceptual inside/outside and thus differently divided and articulated. The practices and effects of Mumbai activism may exemplify one aspect of South Asian sociality as the field of negotiation among different and often conflicting values. Mumbai citizens’ endeavors and dilemmas may thus help us to think about how to co-exist with the “outside” or others, a pressing issue in our contemporary world.

## **Secularizing Nepali Politics: Contentions Interpretation**

**Bhaskar Gautam, Martin Chautari, Nepal**

After the success of the April 2006 People’s Movement, in May, the restored House of Representative proclaimed Nepal a secular state. The secular status of Nepali state was reiterated by the promulgation of the 2007 Interim Constitution. The term “secularism” is now in the official description of the state, but in a deeply religious society what kind of religious ethos the state represents is problematic. In contemporary Nepali society, it is not the “sacred” that is questionable, but the meaning and interpretation of the “secular.” While debating constitution and drafting it Nepalis have accepted the ideal of a secular state, but they have interpreted the term “secular” as they see fit. As the right to interpret “secular” is retained by different actors suitable to their location and ethos what entails secular is deeply contentious – a state that promotes no religion, a state that recognizes all religions equally, a state that has inherited Hindu practices and ethos but it guarantees the rights of all other religious groups, and a state that guarantees the right to convert. This paper will situate “secular” within the relevant constitutional provisions and within the process of secularizing Nepal politics through “conventional” and contemporary lenses. In this process, the paper will engage with several key issues (marginality, rights, federalism and violence) that the democratic context of “secular” debate produces.

## Rethinking the Buddhist Discourses on Politics and Physical Violence

**Tsunehiko Sugiki**, Hiroshima University, Japan

This presentation examines the Buddhist discourses on royal ethic and warfare found in the Buddhist scriptures composed in the ancient Indian subcontinent (between the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BCE and the 6<sup>th</sup> century CE) and, through this examination, makes a small suggestion for peacebuilding in modern South Asia. We also investigate the edicts of Aśoka, the 3<sup>rd</sup> emperor of the Maurya Dynasty in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BCE. Through the examination of these texts, we can point out the following three.

The first point is that Aśoka and the authors of the Buddhist scriptures seem to have tried to renounce waging wars or to limit permissible forms of war to a bare minimum, by which rulers and his warriors are less involved in intentional killing, the most sinful act.

Four ways of handling international conflict are described in these texts. They are: (1) conquest by military force (*viz.*, aggressive war), (2) conquest without resorting to war, (3) defense from armed attackers without resorting to war, and (4) defense from armed attackers by military force (*viz.*, defensive war).

No texts acknowledge the first way. Presumably it is because in this type some kill others intentionally, which goes against the first of the five precepts of Buddhist lay followers, “not to kill intentionally.” The second way indicates Aśoka’s conquest by dharma and the conquest made by the universal monarch. The *Book of Satyaka* teaches the third way as the best to protect his people from armed foreign invaders. Thus, the second and third ways are acknowledged, or not denied. I infer that it is because no one kills anyone intentionally in these ways.

Only the *Book of Satyaka* acknowledges the fourth way as the last resort. Although in this type the defending ruler kills the foreign attackers, he is not sinful because he does it selflessly out of compassion for his people (or his people and enemy warriors) and because it is hard to win the war by the third way. I infer that it is aimed at deterring wars as much as possible.

The second point is that a ruler is expected to protect individual sentient beings, not exclusively particular religious groups and their religions. No texts say that a ruler should fight against non-Buddhist attackers to protect Buddhists and Buddhism. He protects his people (and enemies), including both Buddhists and non-Buddhists.

The third point comes from Aśoka's idea of a kind of "interreligious dialogue." Although his personal belief was Buddhism, he said that one should respect others' religions and listen to good doctrines of them, through which the essentials of all religions grew.

Finally, I make a small suggestion. These three points—(1) the attempt to minimize chances for war by being faithful to the precept "not to kill intentionally," which is also taught in many religions, not only in Buddhism, (2) the resolve to protect individual people without dividing them by religions, and (3) the effort to learn doctrines of other religions to grow the essentials of all religions—may be worth reflecting for those who wish to promote peacebuilding in the Indian subcontinent, which is suffered from several religious conflicts.

## **Abul Sattar Edhi: Modern Incarnation of a Pacifist Sufi**

**Tahir Kamran**, Government College University, Pakistan

The figure of Abdul Sattar of Edhi is indeed an enigmatic one living in the era of modernity. He had forsaken it though not completely he attained the status of an icon in service to humanity without resorting to high politics giving a wide berth to the high life style by embracing simplicity of a Dervish or a Sufi, who while sitting in his *dergah* cares for all, irrespective of religion, caste or creed. Parochialism and exclusionary tendencies are conspicuously missing from the social ideology which he practiced with optimum zeal. Humans as a category does not exist in Pakistan's national discourse but the central focus of Edhi's altruism is human and not Hindu, Muslim or Christian. Thus, he replicated the medieval ethos of a *dergah* in an era of modernity that manifested in South Asian space. Establishment of the *Apna Gher* and Edhi Centre epitomize *dergah* that catered to humans' essential needs. Another attribute of a *Dervish* is his indifference to the material

gain in the South Asian culture only a Sufi/Dervish can wield the trust of the masses—Edhi not only wielded that trust but also honoured it. In this study, the unique phenomenon that Edhi had been, would form the focus. Attempt would also be made to connect Edhi’s phenomenon with the tradition embedded in the medieval South Asian past.

## **Communities and Mediation in Post-conflict Nepal**

**Tatsuro Fujikura**, Kyoto University, Japan

This paper considers the relationship between the production of communities, on the one hand, and the practices of mediation, on the other, in contemporary Nepal where new federal structure is in the making. In particular, the paper discusses the fate of the Tharuhat movement that demanded an “identity-based” federal state in the western plains. According to some of the current political discourses, “identity politics” which gained huge momentum after the conclusion of the armed conflict in 2006, and which threatened national integrity, has been defeated over the course of the past few years. After the promulgation of the new constitution in 2015, and with the conduct of local and federal elections, the keywords seem to have shifted from “identity” and “class” to “stability,” “development” and “prosperity.” With this background, I focus on some of the recent moments in the Tharuhat movement, including the Tikapur incident in which 8 police officers were killed during a massive demonstration, and the actions of some of the Tharu activists who now live under the new constitution which they once deemed so “unacceptable” that they had to burn it. I attempt to interpret the process using, in part, an expanded conception of “mediation” as proposed by William Mazzarella (2006), that includes not only the attempts to harmonize diverging interests, but also and more broadly, social practices that reduce particularities of diverse experience and render them provisionally commensurable and communicable, and in doing so becomes the basis of self-consciousness and desire.

## **Political Communities of the Sorrowing: Living with Loss in Sri Lanka**

**Malathi De Alwis**, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka

On May 19th 2009, Sri Lanka officially declared the end of a three decade-long civil war fought between Sri Lankan government forces (GoSL) and Tamil militants, namely the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Such a sea change in the life of this tiny island nation has come at a tremendous cost; not just in terms of the dead, on both sides, but also those displaced, dispossessed, maimed, traumatized and made bereft. While the de-mining, re-settlement and development of the war-torn regions were embraced with gusto by a triumphant Sri Lankan state, the deeper and more enduring psychic wounds of a war-torn nation sadly remained unaddressed. This continues to be the case under the newly-elected national government of 2015 as well, albeit with some minor changes.

This paper speaks to these underlying wounds by both documenting and analysing post-war battles over memory and forgetting that have been and continue to be fought between the Sri Lankan state and its Tamil populace, particularly those located in the north and east of the island, these past eight years. The complicated positioning of the second largest minority in the country, the Muslims, vis a vis, this battle, will also be explored along with a brief discussion of certain Sinhala communities that commemorate losses incurred due to LTTE attacks.

## **The Peace Paradox: An Ethnography of Everyday life in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), Bangladesh**

**Ranjan Saha Partha**, Jahanginagar University, Bangladesh

Peace studies in recent decades refer not only to the political structure or to the management of the state but designate the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups participating in the peace processes may have led them to experience conflict. This approach has been engaged to guide

an anthropological investigation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Accord 1997 in Bangladesh. The south-eastern part of Bangladesh is commonly known as the region of the CHT. Approximately 845,544 indigenous Jumma people live in the region (BBS, 2011). Most believe in Buddhism, whereas the remainder practice Hinduism, Christianity and indigenous religions, as opposed to Islam, the state religion dominant in the rest of the country. The root causes of conflict in the CHT are centred on identity formation. This issue arose during the British colonial period, in particular, when the colonial government introduced the policy of tribalism in the CHT region. Unfortunately, this policy has continued under the post-colonial regimes even after Bangladesh gained its independence from Pakistan. In response to the categorical refusal by the Bangladesh government to create any space for or grant any recognition to the CHT's indigenous people, the Jumma selected the course of armed conflict. The Bangladesh government responded with militarization as a counter-insurgency measure. In this context of increasing conflict, the main action that functioned to marginalize the Jumma was the resettlement of 400,000 landless Bengalis from the plains of Bangladesh to the CHT region between 1979 and 1987 under a government transmigration programme. The increasing dominance of the Bengalis in this region severely affected the Jumma's livelihood, and Jumma resistance involved increased conflict with the Bengali settlers. Following political negotiation, on 2 December 1997, the CHT Peace Accord was signed between the Bangladesh government and Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS), a political party formed in 1973 to represent the CHT's indigenous people.

To assess how local people experienced the peace process through the CHT Peace Accord 1997, I conducted a qualitative research study in three CHT villages. Drawing on interviews with local people in these rural villages, this paper sheds light on a much-neglected and significant issue. I offer an analysis of their reiteration of the discourses of peace and conflict, the way in which they negotiated and/or contested these discourses, and the everyday dilemmas with which they lived. While most academic discourses on the CHT Peace Accord 1997 in Bangladesh have largely contributed to constructing peace and conflict as "political processes," I closely examine the performativity in the accounts of the Jumma people, the reiteration and citation of existing discourses, as

well as the new possibilities that emerge. I trace how all these discursive practices both contribute to the materialization of existing discourses of peace and simultaneously exclude them.

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